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ABSTRACT: In this paper, I identify two sets of practical values of argumentation from a standpoint 
that places a premium on maximal participatory democracy. The first set includes pedagogical values 
for both teachers and learners. The second set of values are transformative and include: facilitating 
openness as both tolerance and opportunity; facilitating understanding of one’s own positions, 
other’s positions, and the conceptual frameworks underlying them; and, finally, fostering motivation 
by encouraging action. 
 
KEYWORDS: argumentation, audience, bias, conceptual framework, democracy, dialogism, pedagogy 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
 
Like any other theoretical or practical view, argumentation theory is preconditioned 
by various structural assumptions, commitments, and values, whether these are 
made explicit or even recognized by the theorist herself (Warren, 1988; Haraway, 
2004; Nagel, 1986; Gadamer, 1989; Hamblin, 1970, pp. 242-244). Although, of 
course, when they are not, it can be tricky to identify what exactly those 
assumptions are. In this paper, I work from a standpoint valuing maximal 
participatory democracy to argue for two sets of practical values of argumentation 
theory and practice; namely, pedagogical and transformative values. I shall begin by 
situating my approach within a maximally democratic framework and identifying an 
obligation to try to reason and/or argue better that might help us appreciate 
argumentation that engenders values important for maximal participatory 
democracy.  
 
2. SITUATING MY APPROACH 
 
I begin the task of identifying some practical values of argumentation from a 
standpoint valuing maximal participatory democracy. This means I share in 
common with Paul J. Weithman (2000) the assumption that “‘democratic’ is a degree 
concept and that political processes can be more or less democratic” (p. 67). The 
extent of a democracy’s “democracy” depends on the manner by which it 
demonstrates and combines “democracy-conducing features” (ibid.). Whatever this 
set of features might be, I believe that it would, at the very least, include some 
minimal degree of collective decision-making under what Trudy Govier (1999) calls 
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conditions of uncertainty. The viewpoints stemming from this uncertainty should be 
viewed in contradistinction to abstract independent standards of political judgment. 
In most cases, the genealogy of a given political viewpoint is, at its core, a 
collaborative effort. And attempts to bracket out the contingencies therein by 
ontologizing one’s beliefs (and values) as indefeasible cannot operate and have no 
home within a democratic framework valuing maximum participation. In short, we 
can say that claims or projects that offer “value-neutral, ahistorical, or 
noncontextual objectivity” (Warren, 1988, p. 39) would be incompatible with a 
maximally democratic framework.  
For her part, however, Govier simply takes democracy to mean a society filled 
with disagreements that affect all citizens and must be explored and resolved 
reasonably without appeals to deductive certainty. Of course, I agree with Govier on 
this point. But I further believe that a maximally democratic society could be 
described in Van Parijs’ terms as a “society that subjects everything to collective 
decision-making and gives each of its members an equal power in the decision it 
takes” (as cited in Howard, 2002, p. 28). Thus “maximally democratic” also means 
“maximally participatory.” This view assumes that maximum participation is a good 
thing. A maximal participatory democracy is, however, presented here as an ideal. 
Although I am not suggesting any concrete ways to move society closer to it, I will 
identify a variety of practical values of argumentation that can be supplemented for 
varying degrees of participatory democracies. If I am right, this undertaking carries 
with it potential to direct us toward and make explicit the more transformative 
powers of argumentation theory.  
With these preliminary insights in mind, I now turn to the task of identifying the 
practical values of argumentation. My point of departure for doing this entails a 
reinterpretation of J. Anthony Blair’s (1981) thesis that we have a moral obligation 
to try to reason well. This will help clarify later on what exactly I take to be the 
practical values of argumentation, and why we ought to engage in and appreciate 
argumentation that facilitates these values.  
 
3. THE OBLIGATION TO TRY TO REASON AND/OR ARGUE BETTER (AND MORE 
OFTEN) 
 
Blair (2012a) claims that for moral reasons we all ought to, pro tanto, try to conduct 
ourselves reasonably, and as often as possible.1 Stated more formally, his argument 
runs as follows:  
 
P1: If in general we have a moral obligation to [try to] do something, then we have a 
moral obligation to [try to] do whatever else is necessary in order to do the first 
thing. If we have moral reasons to realize the end, then we have moral reasons to 
realize the necessary means to that end. 
P2: We have a moral obligation to [try to] avoid false beliefs and to pursue true 
beliefs. 
                                                        
1 Blair (2012c) says in a postscript that he should “more consistently have written of the obligation to 
try to reason well,” because “it is too morally demanding” otherwise (p. 33). I have thus added “try 
to” to the phrasing of the obligation.  
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P3: Being able to reason well is necessary as a means of ascertaining true and false 
beliefs.  
C: We have a moral obligation to [try to] reason well. (p. 7) 
 
 At the time this article was written, Blair took “argumentation skills as more 
or less identical to skills in critical thinking” (2012c, p. 2). However, Blair has since 
argued that informal logic—which focuses on “teaching the analysis and critique of 
arguments” by teaching “methods of argument analysis and evaluation other than 
formal logic”—cannot be taken as equivalent with critical thinking, because it is 
“one aspect of the theory and practice of argument management; and argument 
management is one element of critical thinking” (2012b, p. 50). Consequently, some 
of the skills involved in reasoning well seem to, at least in part, be involved in and 
can possibly be developed through argumentation.  
Now, Blair’s (2012a) second premise expresses the basic assumption that 
beliefs can be true or false. On this view, reasoning poorly might mean attaining 
false beliefs (and potentially risking harm to others) while reasoning well means 
attaining true ones (and benefiting ourselves and others) (p. 8). If, however, we view 
the matter from a standpoint that appreciates maximal participatory democracy as 
described above, then our treatment of truth with respect to political life (and the 
uncertainties therein) might be different too. We may place a premium on the 
movement to better beliefs from worse ones, rather than in the dichotomous lens of 
either true or false. I prefer this for practical reasons: maximal participation is more 
effective if we can appeal to what we find best to believe in given particular 
circumstances rather than appealing to the truth and shutting down the 
communicative process. From this basis, I contend that we can understand the 
obligation differently; namely, as a moral obligation to try to reason and/or argue 
better (and to do so more often). 
There are other reasons for why we have an obligation to try to reason 
and/or argue better. The first is socio-political. Our lives, for the most part, are 
media saturated and occur within inescapably social contexts at the ontological 
level. At our core, we are what Johnson and Blair (2006) call “consumers of beliefs of 
values” who are always encountering new information and the beliefs of others, and 
many of these are different from or conflict with our own (pp. 1; xi).  
Moreover, our lives occur as fundamentally social. For this reason, our 
consumption of beliefs and values through the statements and arguments of others 
should be viewed as an active process, which, based on Tindale’s (2004; 2009) view, 
we can potentially engage in to varying degrees. To this end, Tindale posits that “[i]t 
seems a fundamental feature of our social beings that we are ‘in audience’” (2009). 
“We always have the standpoint of an audience,” he continues,  
 
of what the experience of an audience feels like; this is our primary relationship to 
argumentation, our entry into it. Individually, and in the groups to which we belong 
or to which speakers assume we belong, we have this potential. We are constantly 
open to being addressed. We are able to learn to be arguers, to engage in 
argumentation from this perspective, because we have first been audiences, and 
engaged from that perspective. Thus, audience as a way of being is fundamental to 
argumentation as a social phenomenon. (p. 47) 
 
LAURA M. BENACQUISTA 
 4 
‘Being in audience,’ then, is an essential aspect of our being in the world, and we can 
always “have the perspective of an audience and hence understand what it can mean 
to be addressed by any particular discourse,” even if we are not part of an arguer’s 
intended audience (2004, p. 152). A simple example should suffice to make this 
point clear: today we have access to historical texts of authors who wrote so long 
ago that they could not have anticipated (to any meaningful extent) the sort of 
horizons of meaning that various twenty-first century readers would have upon 
encountering their texts, but—and this important—we can nonetheless appreciate 
those texts from an audience’s perspective.  
This experience of being in audience, says Tindale (2009), is in part captured 
by Bakhtin’s notion of ‘addressivity,’ which 
 
refers to the ways in which words used in utterances, in their very structure, both 
address and anticipate a response. Utterances are not isolated components of 
discourse, woven together to form a coherent whole; they are essentially dialogical 
in nature, the utterance captures both the utterer and the audience insofar as the 
audience’s expectations, interpretation and response condition the development of 
the utterance and ensuing speech. Transferring this understanding of utterance to 
the genre of argumentation, we must see this dialogical character fixing the 
audience as a primary contributory source of the argumentation… Understanding 
any argumentation, including the intentions involved, must begin as much with the 
audience as the arguer. (pp. 47-48) 
 
For Bakhtin and Tindale, then, context is necessarily central to argumentation (in 
terms of both its construction and evaluation), so are the arguer and her arguments, 
as well as the audience and its responses.  
As a result, dialogism emerges as a central feature of this conception of 
argumentation with respect to argument, evaluation and acceptance. Since 
arguments are co-developed as arguers compensate for the “expectations, 
interpretation, and responses” of audiences, the sorts of objections considered and 
the requisite responses offered by arguers are determined by the ever present 
demands of context, which, above all, fundamentally includes the audience and its 
perspective (and the horizon of meaning underlying that perspective) on the matter 
at hand.2 Thus, with Tindale, we see that our fundamental way of being is such that 
                                                        
2 Govier’s (1999) so-called “Noninteractive Audience” is incompatible with the idea of an active 
audience as part of the context of argumentation. She conceptualizes the noninteractive audience as 
“the [massive] audience that can’t interact with the arguer, and whose [most likely heterogeneous] 
views are not known to him or her” (p. 183), for example, “the audience for many arguments 
presented in the mass media” (p. 189). When dealing with the view that there are cases where mass 
audiences can “talk back,” Govier firmly holds that the audience “cannot respond while the argument 
is being developed, so their challenges and questions of meaning do not affect the final product” (p. 
200n13).  
While I might be accused of taking Govier too literally here, her description of an argument as a static 
“product”—with emphasis on the finality of its completion—reveals and effectively captures the 
difference between her and Tindale’s (2004) understanding of the active audience located in a 
rhetorical approach to argumentation, which, for his part, treats argument as a process. So to use 
Govier’s Noninteractive Audience to undercut the notion of addressivity would be rather dubious 
because, quite frankly, Govier and Tindale are talking about argument in two completely different 
ways. When treated as a process, arguments can evolve and adapt to changing information about the 
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we always already have the potential to engage in reasoning and argumentation. 
And I add that if we are to continue living with each other, we then need to reason 
and argue better.  
 Moreover, when it comes to judging someone as reasoning well/badly, the 
way of reasoning is not inherently erroneous. According to Douglas Walton (1995), a 
particular sort of reasoning might be okay given certain contexts (pp. 14-18). 
Reasoning is contextual and judgments of an argument’s goodness are dependent on 
(relevant) context. Let us consider this observation in conjunction with another: 
Even when we brush aside beliefs or views we encounter but do not care enough to 
think about at all, we tacitly endorse them. This seemingly passive acceptance is 
actually a bare minimum of actively reasoning: we can’t help but reason to some 
extent. Given this, and since the quality of arguments are context dependent, we can 
reason differently than we have before, or how we are inclined to do so. We can, 
then, understand reasoning in terms of better or worse (on a scale of varying 
degrees of better and worse). And insofar as arguing is an activity we can 
understand them in terms of better or worse as well.  
 What this amounts to, at the very least, is that we’re responsible for how well 
we reason and we’re accountable to others who can challenge us when we express 
our beliefs. Whether we like it or not, we are confronted with information that 
needs to be adequately dealt with, and in light of rejecting the essentialist qualities 
of arguments (i.e., their inherent goodness or badness), we can say that we are 
responsible for trying to reason and/or argue well (understood as better); as such, 
we ought to try to do this.  
I will now turn to the task of identifying possible pedagogical and 
transformative values of argumentation that might help us with trying to reason 
and/or argue better.  
 
4. PRACTICAL VALUES OF ARGUMENTATION 
 
4.1 Pedagogical values 
 
Argumentation can be practically valuable for the teaching and learning of 
argumentation evaluation and construction, as well as cultivating the various critical 
thinking skills and dispositions associated with these. And, based on what was 
established in the previous section, I submit that learning is especially valuable 
when these skills and dispositions are taught in a dialogical manner.  
To this end, let us return to Blair (2012) and unpack what he identifies as an 
obligation for teachers of reasoning and argumentation to acquire, which includes 
“as sound an understanding of reasoning and argument as possible” (p. 2) as it 
follows from the foregoing obligation to try to reason well. In doing so, we can 
                                                                                                                                                                     
views and values (or cognitive environment) of the audience, as well as the surrounding details of 
why the audience does or does not accept the argument regardless of whether overt engagement in 
dialogue (in the colloquial sense of the term) has occurred. The scope of a “process argument” is not 
as narrowly circumscribed as the scope of a “product argument,” which would seem on Govier’s view 
to be complete once it has left the hands of the arguer and is taken up by the mass audience.  
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bracket his uncontroversial claim that teachers of reasoning and argument ought to 
be knowledgeable. My concern, however, is that in striving to acquire “as sound an 
understanding as possible” teachers run the risk of attaining too narrow a view of 
reasoning and argument. By this I mean that mining information for the sole 
purpose of building a grand view about reasoning and argument could put one at 
risk for developing a monological lens and a correspondingly myopic approach to 
the topics at issue.  
We should recognize that attaining “as sound an understanding as possible” 
admits of many different pedagogical approaches and should include learning from 
the students that one teaches. Teaching good argumentation and reasoning skills 
should not amount to Freire’s (1970) oft-cited “banking concept of education,” 
which consists of “an act of depositing, in which the students are the depositories 
and the teacher is the depositor” (p. 72). Naturally this pedagogical approach would 
be far too monological for our liking. I do not mean to suggest that this is what Blair 
implies with his claim. I am simply offering a word of caution and want to 
emphasize that there is a certain quality of argumentation that is most valuable with 
respect to engaging students in the evaluation and construction of argumentation.  
A dialogical style of teaching and learning can go a long way toward 
facilitating an understanding of oneself, others, better ways of being sensitive to the 
context of argumentation, and, as a result, the evaluation and construction of 
argumentation, and point to how these aspects are best learned and taught. Indeed, 
through a dialogical and cooperative teaching style teachers and learners can better 
develop what Warren (1988) identifies as important outcomes of teaching and 
learning, namely that “teacher’s/learner’s…eventually come to recognize their own 
conceptual frameworks, see alternative conceptual frameworks, and where 
possible, conduct discussions across conceptual frameworks” (p. 40). These are 
helpful character-building practices that educators should try to engage in better 
and naturally find a home in dialogical argumentation theory.  
 The pedagogical values examined so far may seem like nothing more than 
values of argumentation practice. But the practices developed and promoted 
through theory are not isolated from that theory in a way that make it any less 
valuable than the practices themselves. More specifically, there is, for example, great 
value to taking a meta-view toward the practice of argumentation by understanding 
the theory supporting the practice. A teacher’s understanding of the constitutive 
components of a dialogical argumentation theory, or simply the rationale 
underpinning dialogism, could no doubt contribute to her understanding and 
appreciation of the practice in a way that enhances the quality of her teaching and 
the skills involved, all the while fostering an appreciation for these practices in her 
students. Furthermore, dialogical teaching styles can aid teachers and learners alike 
in developing the dispositions involved in reasoning and arguing better. In short, 
argumentation theory is most valuable when it is involved in the process of 
promoting dialogism inside and outside of the classroom.  
 
4.2. Transformative values 
 
The next set of practical values to explore is the “transformative,” which include (1) 
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openness (understood in terms of both tolerance and opportunity), (2) 
understanding, and (3) motivation. Values (2) and (3) presuppose openness. Taken 
together, these values are understood as transformative in the sense that they serve 
as a precondition for social change. 
I understand openness in two senses. In the first sense, openness is tolerance 
of other views and differently minded people from the perspective of oneself and 
likeminded individuals. In the second sense, the experience of openness is 
opportunity for engagement in discourse from the perspective of the Other. These 
two senses are not so clearly demarcated so as to exclude the possibility that at one 
and the same time I can be open in the sense of tolerating other viewpoints while 
also experiencing the opportunity to engage in dialogical argumentation.  
 My understanding of tolerance follows Warren’s (1988) definition: “being 
receptive (‘open’) to points of view different than one’s own on a given topic or 
issue” (p. 37). “It is difficult,” she says, “if not impossible to consider seriously other 
points of view than one’s own if one is not aware that there are other points of 
views” (ibid.). In other words, ignorance begets ignorance. I take this claim to be 
relatively uncontroversial but useful for illustrating the benefits of tolerance.  
Now, tolerance of viewpoints that conflict with one’s own, or those of one’s 
society, plant the seeds for social transformation. No doubt there is always 
resistance and conflict to different viewpoints, and this is not to say that status quo 
views necessarily require change. Rather, an attitude of tolerance for other voices 
(and otherwise muted voices) provides us with valuable content to learn and even 
deliberate about. If, however, we believe that society should value uniformity and so 
close our collective mind off from different and even subversive voices, we risk 
forcing others to, for example, remain quiet about their suffering if they are 
suffering—and even whether or not we would come to find their claims for 
attention, understanding and/or action legitimate. A few choice words by Richard 
Rorty (1991) help describe the more salient aspects of this phenomenon. We are 
contingent on our acculturation, which  
 
is what makes certain options live, or momentous, or forced, while leaving others 
dead, or trivial, or optional. We can only hope to transcend our acculturation if our 
culture contains (or thanks to disruptions from outside or internal revolt, comes to 
contain) splits which supply toeholds for new initiatives. Without such splits—
without tensions which make people listen to unfamiliar ideas in the hope of finding 
means of overcoming those tensions—there is no such hope…So our best chance for 
transcending our acculturation is to be brought up in a culture which prides itself on 
not being monolithic—on its tolerance for a plurality of subcultures and its 
willingness to listen to neighbouring cultures. (pp. 13-14)  
 
To put the matter in Kantian parlance: tolerance preconditions the possibility for 
meaningful and maximally democratic change.  
However, tolerance is not without its limits. As Carl Sagan (1996) memorably 
put it, “[k]eeping an open mind is a virtue—but…not so open that your brains spill 
out” (p. 187).3 To this end, Warren (1988) has some worthwhile advice to offer us: 
                                                        
3 Sagan (1996) credits this quip to space engineer James Oberg (p. 187). 
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“[T]he extent of one’s willingness and ability to be openminded about issues is,” she 
says, “significantly affected by the conceptual framework out of which it operates. 
Openmindedness is a disposition that persons do or do not exercise within a given 
conceptual framework. This is the essentially contextual nature of openmindedness: 
it is always exercised from within a (some) conceptual framework” wherein “certain 
positions, claims or points of view may be viewed as undeserving of serious and 
equal consideration” [author’s emphasis, et passim] (pp. 37-38). Warren’s 
justification for these claims will become clearer once we investigate her distinction 
between two types of bias. 
Warren distinguishes between bias that generally manifests within a 
particular conceptual framework through false claims or “conceptually flawed 
distinctions,” and bias in the sense of inescapable partiality, a feature of any putative 
conceptual framework (p. 39). As a result of bias in the latter sense, “claims from 
within a given conceptual framework [are] resistant to certain new evidence 
(especially logically incompatible evidence)” (ibid.). This is not, however, indicative 
of closed-mindedness per se. A conceptual framework with the latter sense of bias 
will find certain claims to be “logically incompatible with the basic and defining 
assumptions of the…conceptual framework, and so cannot consistently be added to 
it” (p. 38). For instance, any claim to the innate inferiority of women to men—a 
claim that “makes sense” within a patriarchal framework—is logically inconsistent 
with the most basic assumptions of a feminist conceptual framework, which cannot 
tolerate the claim at all.4  
Not all biases are bad nor are they created equal. For example, the “facts” of a 
patriarchal conceptual framework are established on the basis of not taking into 
account what the feminist one does. More clearly, certain underlying beliefs and 
assumptions on the patriarchal framework are not shared by the feminist 
framework, because the latter has a meta-position whereby it can evaluate and 
challenge the assumptions and beliefs of the patriarchal framework instead of just 
assuming them. Such a framework precludes uncritically accepted assumptions of 
the patriarchal framework from becoming structural features of it. And, 
consequently, at work in the feminist framework is “a better bias…because it is more 
inclusive [that is, tolerant of other’s realities] and less partial” than the patriarchal 
framework, which “is more partial because less inclusive” (pp. 38-39).  
In addition to tolerance, I understand “openness” in terms of opportunity. 
Opportunity constitutes the experience of the tolerated individual(s) entering into 
dialogue with those tolerating her/them. But with respect to argumentation, the 
tolerated individual(s) may enter as either the arguer or the audience. Someone 
whose otherwise muted voice was tolerated by others, for example, can then 
                                                        
4 The discussion of tolerance suggests that we can (and it is important to) escape the influence of our 
basic assumptions. Of course, this may seem strange since these assumptions have been described 
earlier as the lenses through which information and our experiences make sense. Toleration of other 
points of view may be precluded by certain conceptual frameworks, but this does not necessarily 
mean that the subjects of those frameworks cannot develop different, better frameworks. Some 
avenues to explore for how this might be accomplished include Warren’s suggestion of “revolution” 
over “reform” (1988, p. 36), and Gadamer’s (1989) idea of the “fusion of horizons” of meaning. 
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become visible as an arguer. So an argumentation theory that can facilitate tolerance 
as understood above is practically valuable for helping to make it possible for 
individuals who would otherwise be closed off from dialogue to have an opportunity 
to enter into it.  
While tolerance can help individuals achieve participatory status as arguers, 
it can also help them achieve the status of active audience members. But this claim 
needs to be qualified further, for as we saw above, a fundamental feature of our 
existence is that we can always already take the perspective of audience. For this 
reason, what amounts to “achieving the status of active audience members” is that 
the role of those individuals as an active audience matters and is, in turn, broadened 
in scope. In other words, they can have greater opportunity to engage in the dialogic 
process of argumentation. Thus engaging in argumentation requires us to broaden 
the scope of our discussions by acknowledging that suppressed viewpoints should 
be heard and could be catalysts for transformative and substantive change (socio-
politically speaking).  
 The next transformative value I will discuss is encouraging understanding, 
which I take to be a practical transformative value of argumentation because 
understanding, generally speaking, is often required for individuals to work 
together toward common ends, strengthen their own positions, evaluate other’s 
arguments better, and construct one’s own arguments better. That said, 
understanding itself is a textured concept, and we need to approach it needs to be 
approached at a deeper level. 
 To help us do that, I turn to Catherine Hundleby (2010) who maintains that 
argument should “function with epistemic goals in view” (p. 303). Drawing on the 
work of Phyllis Rooney, she claims that argument should be more of a “joint venture 
of knowledge seeking” than oppositional, “reasoning with” rather than “arguing 
against” (p. 302). On this view, it seems that argumentation that encourages 
participants to cooperatively resolve differences of opinion and learn together what 
the best answer to a dispute may be—thereby strengthening positions on the 
matter—is practically valuable. Now, so far as understanding is concerned, 
Hundleby sees it emphasized in the work of Walton (1995) who considers “the 
employment of argumentative discourse to develop one’s own understanding, a 
purpose that he describes as maieutic” (p. 303). In the passage cited by Hundleby, 
Walton also claims that “in many cases a critical discussion can be very valuable and 
informative even though a definitive resolution of the conflict is not achieved…[It 
can have, in part,] the benefit…of increased understanding of the argumentation 
behind the opponent’s point of view” (Walton 1995, pp. 102-103). Even when 
conflicts are not cooperatively resolved, that is, even if there is a “loser” or no one 
“wins” the argument (in the traditional oppositional sense of these terms), then we 
might come to understand our interlocutor(s) better. An argumentation theory that 
fosters this sort of attitude to approaching argumentative exchange can be, no 
doubt, all the more practically valuable.  
Hundleby (2010) further remarks that, according to Walton, the maieutic 
function of argumentation is, unfortunately, “secondary to the goal of persuasion” 
(p. 303). Moreover, Walton (1995) is uncertain about “whether this maieutic 
function leads to knowledge or only to a kind of insight or increased understanding 
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of one’s own personal views and commitments” (p. 103). Interestingly, though, the 
latter possibility he identifies might “be a very important kind of benefit or advance 
that could prepare the way for knowledge. The advance here could be described as a 
kind of negative clearing away of prejudices, bias, dogmatic preconceptions, 
fallacies, and so forth that removes important impediments to the advancement of 
knowledge” (ibid.). Thus, not only might it be possible to understand others better 
through argumentative exchange, we might also come to better understand our own 
points of view. Whether it is a better understanding of the other’s position or one’s 
own that is gained (or even both), that understanding is made possible by a deeper 
understanding of the beliefs and assumptions (i.e. biases) that condition those 
positions. Recognizing these undergirding factors would go a long way toward 
developing the sort of visibility of one another’s conceptual frameworks advocated 
by Warren that we came to appreciate above as valuable for teachers and learners 
above.  
Furthermore, as arguers and addressees, understanding in the ways just 
outlined can be valuable for argument evaluation and construction. If we 
understand our own positions better, and in turn what underlies those positions 
themselves, as well as others’ positions and the beliefs underlying them, then we 
understand more of the argumentative context in which they arise. Greater 
contextual understanding is something that aids our ability to more easily and 
better evaluate and construct arguments. In the former case, it aids our decision-
making in determining whether we will accept (or reject) the argument(s) that we 
are engaged in. As for the latter case, it cultivates a sensitivity to the sorts of 
expectations, interpretations, and responses of audiences. Of course, in keeping with 
the views described above, I must emphasize that evaluation and construction are 
taken here as part and parcel of the same (dialogical) process of argumentation. 
Understanding, then, goes hand-in-hand with openness and one cannot be properly 
implemented without the other.  
 The final transformative value is the facilitation of motivation. I identify it as 
transformative because it may assist agents in their deliberative processes and 
bolster their movements to action. An argumentation theory that fosters tolerance 
and understanding—both practical transformative values themselves—might, for 
instance, be involved in affecting our attitudes toward others and move us to treat 
others better, or even provide us with expanded and new content to inform 
whatever it may be that we are deliberating about (or simply increase the scope of 
matters to deliberate about). These can all potentially be involved in motivating 
action, and better action, which we are generally obligated to try to do.  
In sum, openness and understanding yield a normative thrust which can 
encourage motivation. One hopes that it is not too naively optimistic to think that 
these three ingredients, when taken together, can potentially coalesce to form a 
push toward positive social change.  
 
5. CONCLUSION  
 
After situating my approach to derive some possible practical values of 
argumentation theory and practice within a maximal democratic framework, I tried 
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to illustrate a compatible moral obligation to try to reason and/or argue better, 
which can help us more fully appreciate argumentation that facilitates certain 
practical values that flow from it. From this basis, I identified a variety of 
pedagogical and transformative values of argumentation theory and practice that 
could be useful for societies that value the maximal participation of its citizens. 
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